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1 Introduction
The starting point for this commentary on Wil-
liford’s article is the  commitment to subjective
character as a defining feature of consciousness.
Subjective character is what makes a conscious
experience conscious, i.e., what all conscious ex-
periences have in common in virtue of which we
call  them conscious.  Kriegel (2009,  p.  1)  has
offered  a  distinction  between  the  qualitative
character and the  subjective  character as  two
important aspects of any conscious experience.
If you have a phenomenally conscious sensation
of red, then there is something that it is like for
you to have it. On the one hand, having this ex-
perience feels like this (where this quality distin-
guishes it from feeling a sensation of pain, say).
On the other hand, it feels like something  for
you (i.e., it is subjective in the same sense that
all of your other conscious experiences are sub-
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jective).  Qualitative  character  is  the  distin-
guishing mark of conscious experiences with re-
gard to each other; subjective character is the
common mark of all my conscious experiences.
This latter aspect has also often been referred
to  as  the  me-ishness,  ipseity  or  mine-ness  of
consciousness (Block 1995; Zahavi 1999). 
Williford  recognizes  that,  sadly,  not  all
philosophers  theorizing  about  consciousness
share this commitment to subjective character,
and that  some formulations of  it  in  terms of
mine-ness are misleading in giving rise to objec-
tionable  implications  about  essential  entities
(Metzinger 2011). But for the purposes of this
commentary we can leave aside such controver-
sies  and instead start  with a  shared commit-
ment to this feature, on which this commentary
will exclusively focus.1 As a constraint on a the-
ory of subjective character, Williford maintains
that it has to respect (1) the relational struc-
ture of consciousness, and (2) the Humean intu-
ition that one of the relata, the subject, remains
somewhat invisible and is at least not consti-
tuted by a special (additional) entity. His solu-
tion,  in  short,  is  to  peacefully  combine  these
two intuitions  by  identifying the subject  with
(an episode of or) the stream of consciousness,
which is itself  reflexively self-aware. A further
claim is that this account is supposedly “com-
patible with physicalism” (Williford this collec-
tion, p. 1). I do not address this aspect of Willi-
ford’s rich paper in this commentary, mostly for
reasons of space but also because I think that
the putative truth of physicalism should not put
any  a  priori  constraints  on  a  theory  of  con-
sciousness. 
1 One might argue that this move is already problematic since it looks
like a petitio principii. But I simply take it as an analysis of Nagel’s
phrase that there is something it is like for the organism to experi-
ence something red, say. As a characterization of phenomenal con-
sciousness this is almost unanimously accepted in the field. What it
picks out according to the present analysis is a variant aspect that
differs in different experiences (qualitative character), and an invari-
ant aspect that remains identical across different experiences (sub-
jective character). I do not have enough space here to argue in detail
for this analysis. A further reason for distinguishing both aspects,
subjective and qualitative character, is the phenomenal observation
that we can become conscious of ourselves as the identical subject in
contrast  to the constantly  changing  stream (or  ensemble)  of  con-
scious representations. Here, the qualitative differences of the mul-
tiple representations we have at a time do not matter. What matters
here is that they are related to myself such that I can call them and
experience them as mine (cf. Schlicht 2011).
My commentary is thus structured as fol-
lows. In the  second section, I will recapitulate
Williford’s  take  on  subjective  character  and
point to problems with his identification of the
subject with the stream (or episodes)  of  con-
sciousness.  In the  third and  fourth sections,  I
will present an alternative way of conceptualiz-
ing the subject  in  the context  of  a  theory of
consciousness that also satisfies the constraints
mentioned  above.  On this  alternative  view,  a
mental representation is conscious (i.e., it exhib-
its subjective character) if it is integrated in the
right way into the overall conscious state of the
organism. This overall state includes representa-
tions of the state of the organism. By way of in-
tegration,  all  conscious representations  are
something for the organism that is identified as
the  subject  of  experience.  This  alternative,
which  is  an instance  of  an integration-theory,
has the advantage both of bypassing the prob-
lems that seem to beset Williford’s account and
of being not only compatible with but also sup-
ported by the best empirical hypotheses about
consciousness  currently available.  I  will  sketch
an argument for this view and attempt to an-
swer possible objections to the premises of this
argument.
2 Williford on subjective character
Williford’s aim is to characterize the subjective
character  of  consciousness  in  a  way  that  ac-
counts “for both the Humean intuition that the
subject-relatum is, in some sense, invisible and
that, nevertheless, consciousness has a subject-
object relational structure that is phenomenally
manifest  and non-inferentially  knowable”  (this
collection,  pp.  10-11).  There  are  three  con-
straints on an account of subjective character,
according to Williford: (a) conscious experiences
are relational in having both a subject- and an
object-pole; (b) the subject-pole is not consti-
tuted by some additional, irreducible, or other-
wise special entity; (c) the subject-pole must be
something that is nevertheless manifest in con-
sciousness, not hidden from it. 
Note that it is not an option for someone
taking  subjective  character  seriously  to  agree
that phenomenal consciousness is relational, in-
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volving  a  subject-pole,  but  at  the  same time
holding  that  this  pole  is  forever  “hidden” (p.
11).  This  does  not  work because  such an ac-
count  could  not  explain  subjective  character.
After  all,  we  consider  subjective  character  as
real  only because it supposedly shows up phe-
nomenally: I experience my conscious states as
mine.2 
Williford’s commitment to a subject (sub-
ject-pole) rules out the possibility that experi-
ences may be free-floating entities, not being en-
joyed by  anyone.  Phenomenal consciousness is
supposed to be relational through-and-through,
directed  at some object and existing  for some
subject: “anything that phenomenally appears,
appears  to someone or something” (p. 9).3 In
general, Williford attempts to capture both the
intentionality and the subjectivity of conscious-
ness in the slogan that every experience involves
the “appearance of something to something” (p.
9),  where  the latter  refers  to  subjectivity.  He
leaves the notion of “appearing or of phenomen-
ally manifesting undefined” (p. 10), but in order
for what he says to make sense we have to take
it to be just another way of saying that some-
thing is phenomenally conscious: it is “just the
appearance  to/in  consciousness  of  something”
(p. 10). 
In order to meet the constraints he set for
himself, Williford identifies the subject with the
stream of consciousness or with (some complex
or rich) episode of consciousness (p. 10). This
identity claim then leads to the situation that
the  subject-pole  of  the  consciousness-relation
appearing (or being manifest) in the conscious
episode is the episode itself. The subject-pole is
thereby manifest,  i.e.,  consciously experienced,
but  not  separable  as  an entity from the con-
scious episode in question, and thus it is—in a
sense—invisible. But it is only invisible in the
sense that there is no additional entity that ac-
2 One way to put this with respect to sensations like hunger is to say
that, since they are related to me in such an unmediated sense, it is
impossible to be mistaken about the subject undergoing such sensa-
tions (Shoemaker 1968).
3 This  claim is  defended especially  in  opposition to  what  Williford
calls F-theories, or varieties of first-order representationalism such as
Tye’s (1995) PANIC-theory, which arguably neither accepts nor ex-
plains subjectivity so understood. Higher-order and same-order ac-
counts at least accept this feature of consciousness, which they—mis-
takenly—attempt to explain in terms of representation.
counts for the subject-pole. In order to meet the
constraints mentioned above, Williford therefore
defends  “the  view  that  consciousness  is  self-
manifesting” (p. 10), i.e., an episode or stream
of  consciousness  appears  to  itself no  matter
what  else  is  manifest  to  consciousness  (some
perceived object, say). 
Partly because Williford subscribes to the
Humean intuition that we do not find a self, or
a  “self-entity,  me-haecceity,  me-ish  quale,  or
subject-relatum”  (p. 10)  if  we  turn  to  our
stream of conscious experiences, he is led to the
identification  of  the  subject-relatum  with  the
stream  of  consciousness  itself.  Although  the
conscious episode appears itself  in the episode,
consciousness  is  self-reflexive,  yet  not  self-rep-
resenting.  The  relevant  difference  between  an
unconscious and a conscious episode is not due
to some form of representation. Rather, the con-
scious  episode  contains  an  internal  relational
(intrinsic)  property that is  responsible for the
episode’s being  acquainted with itself.4 Subject-
ive  character  is  thus  supposedly  “the  self-ac-
quaintance of every instance of  consciousness”
(p. 1), which these instances exhibit in virtue of
“some internal relational property” (p. 1). The
subject  of  experience,  being  identical to  the
episode of consciousness, is self-acquainted. But
although  consciousness  is  self-reflexive,  the
claim is not that a mental episode becomes con-
scious through an act of reflection directed at it
(p. 10).  This  is  an  impossible  path  when  it
comes to explaining subjective character, since
an act of reflection presupposes that what it re-
flects upon is already mine in the relevant sense
to be explained (Frank 2007; Zahavi 1999). Re-
flection can discover but not bring into being a
self-referential conscious state. 
Now, the stream (or episode) of conscious-
ness exhibits subjective character in the sense
that  the  stream  itself  is  manifest  within  the
stream  so  that  the  relationality  constraint  is
met, although no additional entity need be in-
troduced  in  order  to  play  the  subject-role.
Therefore, the Humean invisibility-constraint is
met as well.  This is more or less the positive
4 Thus, the property of being conscious (and thus subjective) is not
bestowed upon the episode by some external property, like a higher-
order thought directed at (or representing) it (Rosenthal 2005).
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story as far as I have understood it. The main
philosophical problem for Williford’s account is
to formulate criteria as to how to individuate an
episode. This problem leads to a dilemma for
his account that is spelled out in more detail
below.
If we follow Williford and identify the sub-
ject with complex conscious episodes (or even
the  whole stream of  consciousness),  then sub-
jective character only seems to arise for complex
episodes, and not for any of the episode’s parts
or elements:  “[t]he episode is a unified whole,
the differentiated qualities and objects appear-
ing in/to it  are like its parts […]”(pp. 10-11).
Since he emphasizes that all episodes have parts
(ibid.), I take it that a single sensation of red,
say, consequently does not count as an episode,
because it can hardly be separated into parts;
then it  can instead always appear only as an
element of an episode which is in turn a “uni-
fied whole”. On the other hand, Williford also
emphasizes  that,  trivially,  everything  always
also is an improper part of itself. On this read-
ing, a single sensation of red  could be an epis-
ode. This gives rise to the following options re-
garding the individuation of episodes that can
be put in terms of a dilemma: 
1. If a single sensation of red is too simple to
count as an episode, then all that Williford’s
theory can explain is why the complex epis-
ode as an emergent whole (having single ex-
periences  as  its  parts  or  elements)  is  con-
scious. It cannot explain what makes an indi-
vidual  element  of  this  whole  episode  (or
stream),  a  sensation  of  red  say,  conscious.
But  the  varieties  of  representationalism
(which he criticizes)  aim to explain exactly
this feature of consciousness. A problem with
this first horn of the dilemma is thus that we
need to answer the question whether or not
such single sensations can be conscious inde-
pendently  of  being  an  element  of  a  larger
episode. 
a) If  individual sensations can be conscious
independently, then the question arises as
to whether they can be conscious  without
thereby  exhibiting  subjective  character
(given subjective character only arises on
the level  of  whole episodes).  This  is  not
what  Williford  should  accept  since  he
takes subjective character to be a defining
feature of consciousness; there is no con-
sciousness without subjective character. So
if an individual sensation of red could be
conscious then it could be so only by ex-
hibiting  subjective  character.  This  seems
to lead us to Zeki’s theory of “micro-con-
sciousness”  (Zeki &  Bartels 1998;  Zeki
2007) according to which every individual
node of a perceptual system (visual, audit-
ory etc.) can generate an “atom” of con-
sciousness  independently.  This  is  an  ex-
treme version of what  Bayne (2010) calls
an “atomistic” approach to consciousness,
standing in contrast to more “holistic” ap-
proaches:
“Theorists that adopt an atomistic orient-
ation assume that the phenomenal field is
composed  of  ‘atoms  of  consciousness’—
states  that  are  independently  conscious.
Holists,  by  contrast,  hold  that  the  com-
ponents of the phenomenal field are con-
scious  only  as  the  components  of  that
field. Holists deny that there are any inde-
pendent conscious states that need to be
bound  together  to  form  a  phenomenal
field. Holists can allow that the phenom-
enal field can be formally decomposed into
discrete  experiences,  but  they  will  deny
that these elements are independent atoms
or  units  of  consciousness.”  (Bayne 2010,
pp. 225-226)
The  problem  with  such  atomistic  ap-
proaches is really the phenomenon of the
unity of consciousness, i.e., that such indi-
vidually conscious units would need to be
bound together  to  a  much larger  all-en-
compassing unified “phenomenal field”, as
Bayne  puts  it,  in  order  to  account  for
what we actually experience. But then we
should expect there to be a mechanism re-
sponsible for such phenomenal binding, a
mechanism that we also should expect to
break down occasionally under certain cir-
cumstances;  but there is  no evidence for
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such a mechanism. The phenomenal unity
of consciousness seems to be a deep fea-
ture  of  consciousness  just  like  subjective
character,  in  the  sense  that  it  cannot
break  down  and  that  phenomenal  con-
sciousness cannot occur without it. I agree
with  Bayne’s  point  here  (cf.  Schlicht
2007),  and  I  think  that  Williford  would
not  be  prepared  to  take  Zeki’s  route
either.  At least there is  no indication in
the text that would support this reading.
Alas, Williford also sets aside the import-
ant  issue  of  the  unity  of  consciousness,
which arises given the unresolved problem
of providing criteria for the individuation
of episodes.
b) So we are left with the alternative that in-
dividual sensations cannot be conscious in-
dependently. For an individual element to
become conscious (and to exhibit subject-
ive character) it must then be  integrated
into a larger (cumulative) episode. What’s
needed then is a theory (and a mechan-
ism) explaining how such integration into
an episode takes place. However, then we
are left with an alternative view regarding
the question of what is responsible for a
representation’s  being  conscious,  namely
some  kind  of  integration-theory.  In  fact,
that  is  the  path  I  will  recommend (and
elaborate in more detail) below in section
3. The general idea is that phenomenally-
conscious  representations  are  those  that
are  adequately  integrated  into  a  global
state  (we  may  call  it  an  episode).  My
worry with regard to Williford’s account is
simply that once we have such an integra-
tion-account, there is no need for his addi-
tional story in terms of self-reflexivity in
order  to  explain  subjective  character.
Since subjective character is (taken to be)
a defining feature of conscious experience,
an account that informs us about how in-
dividual sensations become conscious will
also  inform  us  about  how  they  acquire
subjective character: through integration.
2. But that’s not the end of the story. Williford
simply could say that a sensation of red may
be a conscious episode. So far, we have dis-
cussed the problem of individuating episodes
on the assumption that a single sensation of
red cannot count as an episode. Now we have
to discuss the consequences of  the assump-
tion that a single sensation of red may count
as an episode. This leads to two further pos-
sibilities. 
a) One  could  accept  such minimal  episodes
despite the fact that this concession gives
rise to a multiplicity of (streams and con-
sequently)  conscious  subjects.  Although
it’s  metaphysically  (somewhat)  extravag-
ant, this is a perfectly coherent position to
take.  Indeed,  it  seems  to  be  akin  to
Strawson’s theory of the self, according to
which a self lasts only as long as an indi-
vidual state (or episode) of consciousness
(Strawson 1997). But this view flies in the
face of experience. For one thing, it is in-
adequate to explain an important aspect
of  consciousness,  namely  what  we  may
call,  following Kant, the  (empirical) con-
sciousness  of  the  identity  of  oneself  as
subject: “I am […] conscious of the identical
self in regard to the manifold of the rep-
resentations that are given to me in an in-
tuition because I call them all together my
representations,  which  constitute  one”
(B134). What he means is that, at least in
non-pathological cases, I can become con-
scious of myself as the single, (synchronic-
ally  as  well  as  diachronically)  identical
subject vis-à-vis my diverse experiences. I
never identify myself with one or many of
my conscious representations (or episodes
for that matter). Rather, I distinguish my-
self  from  them  as  the  subject who  has
them when I self-ascribe them. And this
empirical  consciousness  of  an  identical
subject is possible, according to Kant,  be-
cause all  my  conscious experiences  are
already  self-related.  I  can  already  call
them mine because they exhibit subjective
character  simply  by  being  phenomenally
conscious. Kant, famously and notoriously,
tried to account for this consciousness of
self by simply postulating a transcendental
unity of apperception in which this is sup-
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posed to originate. If Strawson’s view were
correct,  then  Kant would  presumably
reply  by  pointing  to  a  natural,  yet  im-
plausible  consequence:  “I  would  have  as
multicoloured, diverse a self as I have rep-
resentations  of  which  I  am  conscious”
(CpR B134).  Accepting  this  horn of  the
dilemma  therefore  has  the  consequence
that we would now need a story that helps
us make sense of how the subject of the
sensation of red is related to the subject
that is identified with an auditory sensa-
tion of  a loud sound, etc.  In  effect,  this
would lead to a binding problem for the
multitudinous  “subjects”  of  experience,
since  in  my view,  we cannot  be content
with a multiplicity of conscious subjects. I
also think that Williford might not be sat-
isfied  with  such  an  outcome,  since  he
never entertains the possibility of multiple
subjects in his essay.
b) Therefore—again, on the hypothesis that a
single sensation of red counts as an epis-
ode—one could argue that the multiplicity
of conscious episodes has to be overcome
in favor  of  one (unified)  stream of  con-
sciousness. This calls, again, for an integ-
ration  mechanism  that  produces  such  a
unity. Though I can understand why one
would  now  identify  this  resulting  integ-
rated single stream of consciousness with
the subject of experience, I don’t see any
motivation to identify the episode “single
sensation of red” with a subject of experi-
ence,  if  a  more  complex  combination  of
episodes is needed anyway. 
I  conclude  that  the  problem  of  individuating
episodes either leads to the acceptance of im-
plausible views like Zeki or Strawson’s theories
of consciousness and self or to the need for an
integration  account  that  explains  how  indi-
vidual  elements  are  combined  into  the  one
global conscious experience. The claim I would
like to put forward is that once we have such an
integration  account,  Williford’s  proposal  be-
comes superfluous, because what it is intended
to explain is then already explained by the in-
tegration account.
3 Integration vs. representation
When the aim is to provide an account of the
difference between a representation’s being phe-
nomenally conscious and it’s being unconscious
many philosophers are drawn to some form of
representationalism.  This  is  motivated  in  part
by the prospect of reducing the problem of con-
sciousness  to  the  problem of  intentionality  or
representation (Tye 1995;  Dretske 1995;
Rosenthal 2005;  Lycan 1996;  Metzinger 2003;
Kriegel 2009;  Kriegel &  Williford 2006).  But
many of those who are dissatisfied with a rep-
resentational criterion argue that the difference
is  due  to  some  sort  of  integration (Dehaene
2014;  Van  Gulick 2004;  Edelman &  Tononi
2000;  Damasio 2010;  Metzinger 1995;  Kant
1999;  Schlicht 2011).  Such  integration  may
eventually result in a higher-order or more com-
plex representational  state.  In that  sense,  the
two  accounts  do  not  mutually  exclude  each
other.  But  they give  different  answers  to  the
question of what is responsible for the repres-
entation  exhibiting  the  feature  of  being  con-
scious. To put forward both a representational
condition and an integration mechanism would
amount to wearing a belt as well as suspenders.
Williford’s paper demonstrates that other theor-
ies are also possible. He favors self-reflexivity as
the core feature a representation must exhibit in
order for it to be conscious. 
In  the  first  part  of  his  paper,  Williford
scrutinizes all dominant varieties of representa-
tionalism,  especially  with  respect  to  their  ex-
planatory power regarding the subjective char-
acter of conscious experiences. His case against
first-order, higher-order, and same-order or self-
representationalism is solid, and I have nothing
to add in this regard (cf. also  Schlicht 2008b;
Vosgerau et al. 2008).5 
The basis for answering the question as to
which  conditions  have  to  be  met  by a  single
sensation of red in order for it to be conscious
and subjectively experienced is the observation
5 I disagree with respect to what Williford calls P-Theories, according to
which a “privileged object” is represented which makes all the difference
between conscious and unconscious representations. Williford interprets
Damasio’s theory in this way, but although various representations (of
the body especially) play an important role in Damasio’s theory (as in
most other theories), this is not the whole story (see fn. 7).
Schlicht, T. (2015). Explaining Subjective Character: Representation, Reflexivity, or Integration? - A Commentary on Kenneth Williford.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 39(C). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570061 6 | 12
www.open-mind.net
that  the organism in question is  already con-
scious in the creature-sense. This general con-
sciousness (or state of vigilance) admits of de-
grees (from deep coma to wakefulness) and is
one of the conditions for being able to enjoy a
sensation of  red at all  (Dehaene et al. 2006).
Empirical  evidence  points  to  the  assumption
that the neural structures in the brain support-
ing  this  state  contain  the  relevant  structures
monitoring and regulating the homeostatic bal-
ance  of  the  whole  organism.  Damasio (1999,
2010)  calls  these  structures  “proto-self”-struc-
tures, the biological forerunner of that which we
eventually experience as a sense of self. He as-
sumes  that  the  brain  can only  perform these
functions  of  monitoring  and  regulating  if  the
overall state of the whole organism is represen-
ted in the brain.
In addition  to  representations of  the  or-
ganism, the brain is assumed to produce repres-
entations  of  (objects  in)  the  external  world.
Given the limited capacity of conscious percep-
tion and memory systems, such representations
stand  in  competition  (Koch 2004).  The  basic
idea of integration-theories is that some of these
competing  representations,  like  a  sensation  of
red, are conscious because they are integrated
into a more global state that also contains the
structures  responsible  for  creature-conscious-
ness.  Van Gulick (2004) has sketched such an
integration-theory, based on ideas already to be
found in Metzinger (1995):
The  basic  idea  is  that  lower-order  object
states become conscious by being incorpor-
ated  as  components  into  the  higher-order
global states (HOGS) that are the neural
and functional substrates of conscious self-
awareness. The transformation from uncon-
scious to conscious state is not a matter of
merely  directing  a  separate  and  distinct
meta-state onto the lower-order state but of
“recruiting” it into the globally integrated
state that is the momentary realization of
the  agent’s  shifting  transient  conscious
awareness. (Van Gulick 2004, pp. 76-77) 
In other words, a single sensation of red is con-
sciously  experienced  if  the  neural  activation
pattern supporting this sensation is integrated
in the right way into the neural basis represent-
ing the overall state of the organism, the “dy-
namic  core”  in  Edelman’s  words  (Edelman &
Tononi 2000).6 
Importantly,  the  integration  mechanism
(which is what has to be determined empiric-
ally  in  this  framework)—synchronous  oscilla-
tions, say— is not only responsible for produ-
cing a coherent single experiential state of the
organism;  it  also  thereby  conveys  subjective
character to the integrated individual repres-
entations. If this idea is combined with Dama-
sio’s  (1999)  notion  of  proto-self-structures,
then integration facilitates a strong connection
between the substrate of an individual sensa-
tion (of red, say) and the biological structure
representing  the  organism  in  the  brain.7 Of
course, just like on all other theories, the hard
problem is  not  addressed  head-on,  i.e.,  it  is
not  explained  why activation  of  these  struc-
tures feels like something at all. All that can
be provided (at this stage anyway) is a coher-
ent  story  of  how  all  these  aspects  hang  to-
gether. But one advantage of the present in-
tegration-account  is  that  by  establishing  a
connection between the organism (as represen-
ted  in  the  brain)  and  its  object-representa-
tions we can make sense of the important fact
that  all  conscious  representations  feel  like
something  for  the  organism.  The  organism
provides, as Damasio puts it, a “haven of sta-
bility  and invariance”  (1999,  p.  142,  p.  153;
see  also  Metzinger 2003,  p.  161),  i.e.,  just
what we need in order to account for subject-
ive  character.  For  remember  that  subjective
6 Another way to think of this is along the lines of the “Global Neur-
onal Workspace Model” in which attentional mechanisms determine
which of the neural coalitions are integrated (Dehaene et al. 2006).
But means other than attention are possible.
7 Williford discusses Damasio’s theory under the label of a P-Theory
as a variety of representationalism and finds it wanting. Of course,
representations of various sorts, especially of the organism, play an
important role in Damasio’s theory (as in many other theories). But
I do not share Williford‘s interpretation that it is these (special) rep-
resentations as such that are responsible for consciousness. Various
representations (or maps, as Damasio also calls them) have to be in-
tegrated in the right kind of way in order for there to be something
it is like for the organism. Therefore, I do not consider Damasio’s
theory a version of representationalism since there, the mechanism
responsible for consciousness is not representation but integration of
body representations with object representations via recurrent activ-
ations  in  so-called  “convergence  zones”  (Damasio 1994,  p.  95-96,
162).
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character  is  the  feature  that  remains  stable
across  different  representations,  while  qualit-
ative  character  is  the  feature  that  distin-
guishes  different  representations  from  each
other. So in order to get an account of sub-
jective character started, we have to look for
the point of “maximal invariance of content in
the conscious model of reality”, as  Metzinger
(2003, p. 134) puts it. Metzinger agrees that
this invariance is most likely due to the organ-
ism  and  its  bodily  structures  represented  in
the brain, since it is  invariance (or mainten-
ance  of  homeostatic  balance)  that  keeps  the
organism  alive.  Another  advantage  of  this
view is that it does so without introducing a
questionable new entity and by avoiding Willi-
ford’s  phenomenologically  counterintuitive
claim that the stream of consciousness should
be identified with the subject of experience. In
this commentary, I cannot argue in detail for
this  positive  alternative but  hope that  these
sketchy  comments  give  the  reader  a  general
idea of what it aims at. Since I am dissatisfied
with Williford’s identification of the subject of
experience with the stream or an episode  of
consciousness,  let  me now finally turn to an
argument for  a  different  conceptualization of
the subject. 
4 The subject as organism
My alternative claim is that we should simply
identify  the  subject  with  the  organism.  This
section  is  an  attempt  to  support  this  bold
claim. The premises of the argument focus on
analyses of  the structures of  phenomenal con-
sciousness and intentionality:
Premise 1 (phenomenal consciousness): 
Phenomenal  consciousness  is  characterized  by
there being something that it is like for a sub-
ject to be in that state. In this minimal sense,
consciousness is relational and requires the as-
sumption of a subject-pole of experience.
Premise 2 (intentionality): 
The structure of  intentionality is  such that  a
subject is directed (via some psychological act or
attitude like believing, desiring, perceiving etc.)
at a content, object, or state of affairs. Inten-
tionality  is  quasi-relational  since  at  least  the
subject must exist, although the intentional ob-
ject need not exist.8
Premise 3 (subject identity): 
The  subject  that  is  intentionally  directed  is
identical to the subject for whom there is some-
thing  that  it  is  like  to  be in  a given mental
state.
Premise 4 (embodied cognition): 
Many  intentional  attitudes  (like  perceiving,
grasping,  emoting)  are  embodied and  can  be
ascribed only to an embodied agent, i.e., to the
whole organism.
Conclusion: 
The  subject for which there is something it is
like to be in a given mental state and the sub-
ject that is intentionally directed at a content or
object is the organism.
4.1 Elaboration of the premises
Premise 1: Phenomenal consciousness
First of all, it is interesting to note that Nagel’s
initial characterization of consciousness in terms
of there being something that it is like is already
concerned with  the organism as the entity  for
which there is something that it is like: After
having noted the diversity of beings capable of
conscious  experience  which  may  lead  to  very
different  kinds  of  conscious  experience,  Nagel
argues that “no matter how the form may vary,
the fact that an organism has conscious experi-
ence at all means, basically, that there is some-
thing it is like to  be that organism, […] some-
thing it is like for the organism” (1974, p. 436).
So,  given  that  the  philosophical  community
seems to have agreed to refer to Nagel’s slogan
in order to characterize phenomenal conscious-
ness  in  the  first  place,  they  should  seriously
consider  Nagel’s  talk  of  the  organism  as  the
subject of experience. But apart from this ob-
8 A reviewer pointed out that different thinkers had different opinions
about what is intentionally directed: the mental state, the psycholo-
gical act, or the thinker etc. As will become clear below, I do not
share the view that a mental state is itself directed, but favor the
view that a creature of some sort is directed at something via an act
or attitude. A great advantage of this view is that such attitudes are
not limited to mental states like beliefs and desires (as traditionally
held),  but  it  also  allows  also  for  motor  intentional  attitudes  like
grasping or holding etc., i.e., essentially bodily ways of being direc-
ted (premise 4). For details see Schlicht (2008a).
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servation, all that is stressed in the first premise
is the relational character of phenomenal con-
sciousness, much in the sense of one of the com-
mitments  defended  in  Williford’s  paper.  The
reasons for holding this are mainly phenomeno-
logical: it simply appears that way. And we are
all aiming at a theory of why this is so. Willi-
ford’s elaboration of the relational structure of
consciousness in terms of the genitive and dat-
ive of manifestation captures the intuition ex-
pressed in this premise very well. Thus, there is
not much room for disagreement here.9 
Premise 2: Intentionality
In his canonical elaboration of the structure of
intentionality, Subject—Intentional Mode—Con-
tent,  Tim Crane (2001, p. 31) admits that he
does  not  provide  an  account  of  the  first  re-
latum, “because the nature of the subject is not
something that is within the scope of this book
(strange as that may seem)”. Yet, as far as in-
tentional states are concerned, the assumption
that attitudes are not free-floating entities but
come along with a thinker, perceiver, or believer
is rather uncontroversial. What’s controversial is
how  we  should  characterize  the  subject  and
what kind of commitment is implied in the “ac-
ceptance” of a thinker, perceiver, or believer.10
Premise 3: Subject identity
In  a  way,  this  premise  is  at  the  same  time
trivial and important. First of all, if one accepts
premises  1 and  2, then it is natural to accept
premise 3, if only because the alternative would
lead to a multiplicity of subjects, giving rise to
questions regarding the relations between them.
I discussed this option above in section 2. There
are  many debates  about  the  relation  between
consciousness  and  intentionality,  but  there  is
hardly any debate about the relation between
the subjects of each . So in a way, this premise
simply states the obvious, given premises 1 and
2. But it is plausible to accept it even independ-
ently of these premises as the default position.
One important reason for this is that there are
many conscious experiences that are both phe-
nomenal  and  intentional—perceptual  experi-
9 I support this premise in more detail in  Schlicht (forthcoming).
For the purposes of this commentary it is sufficient to note the
agreement on the intuition that phenomenal consciousness is rela-
tional. 
10 Again, I argue for this premise in Schlicht (forthcoming).
ences, for example. If I am looking at a red to-
mato, then my conscious experience presents me
with an object in the external world at which I
am thereby visually directed. But there is also
something that it is like for me to see the to-
mato  if  I  am  phenomenally  conscious  of  it.
Since it would be odd to claim that there are
two subjects involved here—one being intention-
ally directed and one being conscious of the to-
mato—the default position is that it is one the
same subject that is intentionally directed and
phenomenally  conscious.  Second,  despite  the
discussion  among analytic  philosophers  in  the
last fifty years, it is not clear that phenomenal
consciousness  and intentionality can be separ-
ated from each other so easily anyway. In fact,
proponents  of  phenomenal  intentionality  (or
cognitive  phenomenology,  see  Bayne &
Montague 2011)  like  Searle (1992),  Strawson
(2004),  Pitt (2004),  Horgan &  Tienson (2002),
Kriegel (2013) and others argue to the contrary.
Again, then the premise simply states the obvi-
ous.
But this premise also is important because
once  we  commit  to  it,  we  can  follow  either
premise  1 or  2 in  our  investigation  to  see
whether  we  can  formulate  constraints  on  the
nature of the subject based on either conscious-
ness or intentionality. This is the job of premise
4, which accepts lessons from recent investiga-
tions into ways of being intentionally directed.
Premise 4: Embodied Cognition
Cognitive Science has recently been dominated
by discussions on the so-called 4Es, i.e., embod-
ied,  embedded,  enactive,  and  extended  cogni-
tion. These notions characterize four important
ways in which our current theorizing about cog-
nition departs from classical  cognitive science.
They are more or less independent of each other
and can be accepted and rejected in isolation.11
This is not the place to elaborate in detail all
four  of  them,  especially  because  for  the  pur-
poses of this argument only the feature of em-
bodiment is important. Many of our psycholo-
gical acts, like perceiving, being emotionally dir-
ected at or affected by something or other, per-
forming  intentional actions, etc., are embodied
11 An exception may be the intricate connection between cognition be-
ing embodied and (therefore) being embedded. 
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in the sense that features of an organism’s non-
neural body contribute importantly—be it caus-
ally or even constitutively—to the execution of
these cognitive acts (Wilson & Foglia 2011). 
A plausible claim defended by enactivists
is that even a basic cognitive act like perceiving
involves  many  bodily  movements  like  eye-,
head- and whole-body movements when looking
at or focusing on an object, or when jointly at-
tending  to  an  object  with  someone else  (Noë
2004).  This  can be  accepted independently  of
more radical claims regarding the usefulness of
representations typically put forward by enact-
ivists  (Hutto &  Myin 2013).  What’s  more,  a
bulk of empirical evidence has accumulated that
supports  the  important  role  of  the  body and
bodily actions for psychological acts:
a) Facial expressions and bodily postures are ar-
guably constitutive elements of feelings and
their  expression.  Many  theories  of  emotion
such  as  multifactorial  models  (e.g.,  Scherer
2009;  Welpinghus 2013)  usually  include  as
one component a  bodily  feature.  Moreover,
eye-  and head-movements count among the
constitutive  and  content-determining  ele-
ments of visual perception (Noë 2004). 
b) Research  on  mirror  neurons  has  demon-
strated the intricate relation between perceiv-
ing and acting  in  the  sense  that  the  same
neural structures are employed for the execu-
tion and observation or recognition of inten-
tional acts and emotional expressions (Rizzo-
latti &  Sinigaglia 2008;  Keysers 2013). Con-
troversial  debates  about  the  role  of  mirror
neurons for social cognition notwithstanding,
it is fair to say that from a neural perspect-
ive,  perception  and action have to be con-
sidered  as  constituting  one  single  complex
system. We develop motor programs for the
performance  of  certain  actions  and  reuse
these programs in our observation of others
when they perform such actions. These motor
programs  contain  goal-directed  representa-
tions with a bodily format (Goldman &  de
Vignemont 2009) that are crucially different
from the propositional format of a belief, say.
c) What’s more, lessons from studies of patholo-
gical conditions like visual form agnosia (Mil-
ner & Goodale 1995) suggest that we can be
directed at an object in a purely motor-inten-
tional way, thereby demonstrating a “bodily
understanding”  (Kelly 2002)  of  an  object
that is not based on concepts and cannot be
put into appropriate words. 
Generalizing these (and many other) points (see
e.g.,  Gallagher 2005) leads to a paradigm shift
with regard to our understanding of the subject
of intentionality: intentionality is not restricted
to propositional attitudes; an embodied agent,
i.e., an organism,12 has many sensorimotor, af-
fective, and cognitive means to be directed at
objects and states of affairs. This way of under-
standing  the  structure  of  intentionality  allows
us  to  capture  many  more  phenomena  that
clearly fall under the name of intentionality as
directedness, e.g., reaching for and grasping an
object. 
All the premises taken together yield the
conclusion that there is one subject capable of
intentionality  and  consciousness  that  can  be
identified  with  the  organism  (not  with  the
stream  of  consciousness),  characterized  by  a
variety  of  cognitive  capacities  allowing  for  a
range  of  intentional  attitudes—some  of  which
are  affective,13 others  sensorimotor,14 and  still
others are of sophisticated cognitive15 varieties.
The overall state of the subject, being the whole
organism, is represented in the brain. This rep-
resentation contains information about its body,
its interior milieu, etc., such that all representa-
tions having to do with the organism’s interac-
tion with objects can be coupled to or integ-
rated with the representations monitoring and
regulating  the  state  of  the  organism  in  the
12 Talk about embodied agents is broader than talk about organisms.
The  biological  constraints  on  full-blown  cognitive  and  conscious
agents are currently unknown. Whether artificial cognitive systems
are possible depends on the limits set by such constraints. In this pa-
per, I cannot address this point.
13 One of Brentano’s examples in his famous passage on intentionality
being the mark of the mental is love, in which someone is loved. This
example cannot be adequately captured by restricting intentionality
to  propositional  attitudes  which  can  be  formulated  using  “that-
clauses”.
14 Many forms of being intentionally directed are sensorimotor, e.g., all
that has to do with perception and action, this being the biologically
primary form of intentionality (Searle 1983, p. 36).
15 Most cognitive varieties of intentionality are sophisticated and pro-
positional, like beliefs and desires, which can be put into sentences
containing “that-clauses”, e.g., Ken believes that physicalism is true.
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brain. On the basis of such couplings, it is in
principle possible to make sense of the idea that
object-representations become subjective in the
sense of being something for the organism. 
A caveat: this does not amount to an ex-
planation of how consciousness arises in the first
place, or of  why integrated representations are
experienced  at  all.  But  hardly  any  theory  of
consciousness has properly addressed this hard
problem so  far  (Chalmers 1996).  The  limited
claim of this commentary is that we can at best
make sense of the subjective character of phe-
nomenal consciousness if we adopt an integra-
tion-theory  as  outlined  above  and  regard  the
subject for which there is  something that it is
like as the whole organism. As I concluded in
the first part, depending on how he is going to
individuate episodes—a problem which he has
not yet solved—, Williford seems to be in need
of such an integration-account anyway. There-
fore, this sketch of an alternative should be ap-
pealing for someone taking subjective character
seriously.16 
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